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Note: The Regulation of Corporate Image Advertising
American consumers are increasingly being exposed to cor-
porate image advertising.' Reflected in the increased expendi-
tures devoted to it, 2 this growing use of corporate image adver-
tising has raised serious questions about its regulation.3 While
the general regulation of advertising by the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) is well established, corporate image advertising
has remained unregulated. 4  This Note will outline the devel-
opment and use of corporate image advertising, evaluate the ex-
tent of first amendment protection, and discuss possible FTC reg-
ulation.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE
IMAGE ADVERTISING
A. DEFINITIONS
Corporate image advertising sells "ideas" rather than prod-
ucts.5 Although the subject matter of image advertising is thus
intangible, there are apparently two more or less distinct types
of "ideas". The first is the image of the advertising corporation
itself as an abstract reality. The second is the advertising corpo-
ration's position on issues which may appear not to concern the
corporation directly, but on which it still wishes to express its
opinion.
The concept of image advertising seemingly implies the ex-
istence of a corporate image. In its everyday transactions, a cor-
1. Hewens & Poppe, Corporate Advertising: New Imperatives for
an Old Device, 28 PuB. REL. J., Nov., 1972, at 8.
2. For example, corporate image advertising expenditures in-
creased from approximately $158 million in 1971 to $182 million in 1972.
1971-72 Expenditures for Corporate and Association Advertising, 29 PUB.
REL. J., Nov., 1973, at 30 (The corresponding figure for 1973 is not as
yet available.) However, such expenditures are still only a minute por-
tion of the nation's total advertising budget which amounted to approxi-
mately $21 billion in 1971 and $23 billion in 1972. U.S. BmlAu oF THE
CENsus, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT OF TE UNIED STATES 758 (1973). During
1973 expenditures for all advertising hovered at $25 billion. Advertising
Age, Dec. 17, 1973, at 3, col. 1.
3. See 103 TnmEF Feb. 11, 1974, at 30; Advertising Age, Aug. 9, 1971,
at 3, col. 1.
4. Institutional advertising, as corporate image advertising has also
been called, was involved in R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d
Cir. 1964). The practice at issue, however, was an advertising allowance,
not the advertising itself.
5. G. FLANAGAN, MODEMu INSTINONAL ADVERTisiNG 7 (1967).
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poration transmits numerous messages to customers, employees,
shareholders, and others with whom it deals. 6 The corporate
image might be defined as the sum of all the impressions cre-
ated by these messages.7 Unable to perceive or comprehend all
the numerous facets of corporate activity, the public tends to
condense its understanding of the corporation into a more man-
ageable concept." If generally held by the public, this simplified
concept can be viewed as the corporation's image.9
Like advertising, public relations is used by the corporation
to shape its image.' 0 The task of public relations is to identify
the favorable and unfavorable elements of the image and then
to emphasize to the public the former while de-emphasizing the
latter. Public relations is generally carried out through all
forms of communications except paid advertising."' Paid adver-
tising, in its most familiar form of product advertising, is the use
of any paid forum for the purpose of imparting information, de-
veloping attitudes, and inducing action beneficial to the adver-
tiser, such as the purchase of a particular product or service. 12
A specific type of product advertising is brand advertising,
which seeks to create a unique set of properties or mental im-
ages corresponding to the advertised brand, so that these prop-
erties or images might affirmatively influence the consumer's
buying decision.' 3 Corporate image advertising is a hybrid crea-
ture designed to use the means of paid advertising to accomplish
the goal of public relations. Unlike product or brand advertis-
ing, it seeks to create a favorable impression of the corporation
6. Marinteau, Sharper Focus for the Corporate Image, 36 HARV.
Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec., 1958, at 53-54.
7. J. CRAWFORD, ADVERTISING 23, 446 (2d ed. 1965). G. FLANAGAN,
supra note 5, at 66-67, defines a corporation's image as its "personality"
or its "reputation." E. Binm & W. KELLEY, THE M-ANAGEMENT OF PRO-
MOTION 156 (1965) defines the corporation's image as the "stereotype"
with which the public equates the company.
8. H. HEPNER, AyTTIsING--CRETIVE COMMUNICATION WITH CON-
smMERs 209 (1964).
9. G. FLANAGAN, supra note 5, at 64, suggests that there is not a
single "image" of a corporation, but that the image is personal to the
beholder. If that were true, however, there would be no logic in attempt-
ing to shape the corporation's image through advertising, as each individ-
ual would have to be approached separately.
10. B. ZOLLO, THE DOLLARS AND SENSE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 6 (1967).
11. L. BLumENTHAL, THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 3 (1972).
12. R. COLLEY, DEFINING ADVERTISING GOALS FOR MEASURED ADVER-
TISING RESULTS 51 (1961).
13. C. SANDAGE & V. FRYBuRGER, ADVERTISING THEORY AND PRACTICE
205-07 (1958).
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itself rather than just a product or brand, but unlike public re-
lations, it is conducted through paid advertising.
Corporate image advertising may also be concerned with the
other type of "idea" in the broad subject matter of nonproduct
advertising.14 Through the use of "advertorials," the advertiser
may communicate his position on matters which he considers im-
portant, although they are not directly related to the advertiser's
own image. This is a less common but increasingly important
type of corporate image advertising.
There is no clear distinction in the effects of these two types
of advertising. In some cases, for example, the stand which a
corporation takes on public issues will affect its image markedly.
It is nevertheless possible to analyze problems of regulation in
terms of two types of corporate image advertising designed to
perform two separate functions-sales-oriented advertising to
improve a corporation's position in the market, and issue-ori-
ented advertising to obtain access to the forum of opinion on
general issues affecting the business climate or the public wel-
fare. The ultimate goal of both types of advertising may well be
economic benefit to the corporation. 15
B. H STORY An CURUNT USE
A review of the development of corporate image advertising
will demonstrate how it has been utilized. The publication in
the fifties of The Mass Image of Big Business 6 by Gardner and
Rainwater and other articles and studies on the image of big busi-
ness and its economic consequences gave rise to a rash of corpo-
rate identity advertising campaigns. 17 Simply put, the thesis
was that the average American had serious misgivings about
the size and remoteness of big business, misgivings which could
adversely affect his buying decisions.'8 Corporate identity cam-
paigns were undertaken to dispel those misgivings and to instill
14. Id. at 104.
15. In a closely related context, proponents of increased "corporate
responsibility" sometimes justify the active intervention of corporations
and their money in social problems such as urban decay and underem-
ployment on the ground that business is better off in a generally health-
ier society. Albrook, Business Wrestles With Its Social Conscience, 78
FORTUNE, Aug., 1968, at 88; Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the
Social Crisis, 50 BOSTON U.L. REv. 157, 162-63 (1970).
16. Gardner & Rainwater, The Mass Image of Big Business, 33
HARV. Bus. Rsv., Nov.-Dec., 1955, at 61-66.
17. B. ZoLLo, supra note 10, at 60.
18. Martineau, supra note 6, at 58.
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in the consumer an image of the advertiser as an entity which he
could trust.
This trend in advertising produced a bandwagon effect 9
which eroded the credibility of the advertisements themselves and
complicated the already difficult task of assessing their effec-
tiveness. By the early sixties, a reaction had set in critically
questioning the basic premise that the consumer's buying deci-
sion might be significantly influenced by the image of the com-
pany from which he buys.20  This premise was never conclu-
sively established, but neither was it conclusively discredited; at
best the critics assailed the corporate identity binge by condemn-
ing specific advertising campaigns that proved useless or even
counter-productive. Possibly the epitome of the latter was the
steel company advertisement depicting a burly steelworker to
create an image of strength, but instead creating the image of a
bully.2 1
This reaction did not eliminate corporate image advertising,
but merely dispelled some of its mystique. In the late sixties,
corporate image advertising was used to meet new challenges,
principally the assaults of the consumer movement 22 and the
growing popular impression that business was responsible for,
yet indifferent to, rising social problems such as pollution and
urban blight.23  Utilizing both sales-oriented and issue-oriented
corporate image advertising, a company could fend off assaults
by creating the favorable image of a concerned, dynamic com-
pany involved in the solution of social problems,24 and also by
19. See G. FLANAGAN, supra note 5, at 63-64.
20. Finn, Stop Worrying About Your Image, HAPEas, June, 1962,
at 77.
21. G. FL"ArAN, supra note 5, at 67-68.
22. Hewens & Poppe, supra note 1, at 10: "Social awareness em-
phasis has dwelled heavily upon such concerns as auto safety, ecology,
interpersonal relationships, inflation, consumerism." Related to the need
to respond to "consumerism" is the need for good relations with govern-
ment agencies. Martineau, supra note 6, at 54, states that, "I think...
the corporate image is extremely important in dealing with government
functionaries." See also G. FLANAGAN, supra note 5, at 19.
23. Day, Closing the Credibility Gap In Environmental Control, 40
Bus. MGMT., June, 1971, at 36. The response of business is summed up
in the "social responsibility doctrine." See McDonald, How Social Re-
sponsibility Fits the Game of Business, 82 FORTUNE, Dec., 1970, at 104-
05. See also note 15 supra.
24. One of the more glaring failures in this endeavor was an adver-
tisement by Potlatch Industries. In a promotion of its pollution expendi-
tures, the company pictured the Clearwater River, on which its plant
is located, as clean and free of pollution. Unfortunately, the picture was
of the river upstream from the plant. See We Nominate for Oblivion
[Vol. 59:189
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expressing its own opinion as to the correct solutions for society
to adopt. The entire episode made prophets of Gardner and
Rainwater, who had stated in 1955 that "unless management un-
derstands the public's underlying feelings, it can unwittingly
pave the way for hostile reactions and a lowering of the prestige
of big business."2 5
Currently, although corporations must still contend with the
criticism of consumer and environmental interests, 26 an economy
plagued with shortages presents corporate image advertising
with new challenges. Shortages of paper and energy are ex-
pected to restrict the volume of the regular media, particularly
the printed media, thus diminishing the amount of media space
available for public relations. A contraction of normal public
relations operations, such as press releases, through which cor-
porations have long projected their images, will foist these func-
tions upon paid corporate image advertising.27
The uncertain availability of products in a shortage economy
will also cause a switch from product advertising to image ad-
vertising. Especially in the utilities industry, the current mes-
sage of many advertisements encourages conservation rather than
consumption and portrays the utility company's concern about
an energy shortage and its efforts to overcome it. The objective
is to survive the shortage period with as few disruptions of serv-
ice as possible, and one means is to restrain demands for serv-
ice. 28
The energy shortage has also caused an attempt by the oil
industry to avert undesirable political repercussions by respond-
ing to its critics through corporate image advertising. 29 The
Those Stupid, Hypocritical Corporate Ads, 56 INDUST. MKTG., March,
1971, at 68.
25. Gardner & Rainwater, supra note 16, at 66.
26. Brouillard, Some Advantages of Corporate Advertising (edito-
rial), 29 PuB. REL. J., Nov., 1973, at 3. "Consumerism" may not have
the same impact in the 70's as it had in the 60's. See Advertising Age,
Dec. 17, 1973, at 28, col. 1. The need to comment on public issues in
general, however, may be increasing. See Danko, A Perspective on Cor-
porate Communications, 30 PuB. REL. J., Aug., 1974, at 10; Advertising
Age, March 4, 1974, at 6, col. 2.
27. Kindse & Callahan, Facing the Issues: Corporate Advertising's
Greatest Challenge, 29 Pus. REL. J., Nov., 1973, at 7. Cf. Cohan, The New
Role of Advertising in a Period of Shortage, 58 INDUs. MKTG., Nov., 1973,
at 66, 68 (advertisements should advocate product efficiency, conserva-
tion, and utility).
28. Springer, Demarketing Power: Utility Companies Explain the
Energy Crisis, 29 PuB. REL. J., Nov., 1973, at 32.
29. 103 TIME, Feb. 11, 1974, at 30.
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pattern of problem and response in the oil industry is typical of
public relations, and probably foreshadows a major use of corpo-
rate image advertising in the future. Shortages which cause
curtailment of supply can result in consumer unrest, which in
turn can spawn consumer action. To prevent adverse action, the
industry must respond to the unrest, a task for which corpo-
rate image advertising is best suited.
Outside of industries beset by shortages, corporate image
advertising is currently used primarily to promote sales rather
than to express the corporation's opinion in the public forum.
The promotion of sales may be pursued in two ways, both based
on the premise that the consumer's buying decision is influenced
by his impression of the producer. One technique is known as
"corporate positioning"--an effort by the corporation to make
its own name more or less synonymous with the product it
makes.80 For example, Campbell's is not just a producer of
soup, Campbell's is soup. This is not because there are no other
producers of soup, or because Campbell's produces nothing but
soup, but Campbell's advertising has so reinforced the message
that Campbell's is the primary soup producer that this idea has
become virtually impregnated in the American culture. Ulti-
mately, the goal of corporate positioning is to establish the
manufacturer or seller as a strong, reputable leader in the in-
dustry, whose products must reflect its integrity and leader-
ership.31
The other current technique of corporate image advertising
is to project or transfer a corporate identity.32 This is an import-
ant goal for a firm whose diversified holdings do not accord
with the established identity of the parent firm.33 In order for
the company's employees to see their employer in proper per-
spective, the corporation should have an identity to which
30. Hewens & Poppe, supra note 1, at 8.
31. Effective "corporate positioning" can help a corporation ride out
a crisis. For example, another soup producer, Bon Vivant, was forced
into bankruptcy by adverse publicity resulting from the production of
some contaminated soup. At nearly the same time, a few cans of Camp-
bell's soup, suspected of being contaminated, created hardly a ripple be-
cause Campbell's reputation was much better established. See W. Salter,
Upbeat! Just What is Corporate Advertising? (Time, Inc. memo (no
date) on file in Univ. of Minn. Law Library).
32. Bus. WEEK, Feb. 20, 1971, at 52-53.
33. Stone, What's Ahead for Corporate Advertising, 28 Pus. REL. J.,
Nov., 1972, at 62. B. ZoLo, supra note 10, at 67, cites Morton Salt Com-
pany as an example of a corporation which enjoyed a firmly established
identity in one field and then sought to project that identity into other
areas.
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they can relate and which can survive the acquisition of diversi-
fied holdings.3 4 This argument for an identity applies with even
greater force to the company's customers, whose loyalty to the
parent firm cannot be transferred to the subsidiary, or vice
versa, unless each can be identified with the other.35
C. EFFECTIVENESS oF CoRpoRATE IMAGE ADVERTISING
The effectiveness of any form of advertising is difficult to
determine. 0 In Confessions of an Advertising Man, David Ogil-
vie relates the dilemma of the businessman who states, "Half
the money I spend on advertising is wasted, and the trouble is I
don't know which half. '37 The effectiveness of product advertis-
ing can theoretically be measured by the level of sales of the
product: if sales improve following an advertising campaign,
the increase can in some cases be attributed to the advertising. 38
But there are few statistics. With respect to corporate image
advertising, the uncertainty is compounded by the lack of a
standard of measurement. Corporate image advertising-even if
"sales-oriented"-is designed to sell ideas rather than products,
and its effect on product sales is at best indirect. Consequently,
there is no monetary gauge of the effectiveness of corporate im-
age advertising.39 Other measurements are designed only to re-
flect the public's "awareness" of or "favorability" towards the
corporation, 40 and while they can show changes in public opin-
ion, these measurements are difficult to translate into terms of
profit and loss.
The translation of public opinion into profit and loss raises a
basic question about the theory of corporate image advertising.
There has been an implicit assumption that the public's opinion
of a corporation-that is, its image-somehow influences the
34. Id. at 61-62.
35. H. HEPER, supra note 8, at 216.
36. A. FREY & J. HATE~mAN, ADVERTiSiNG 483-84 (4th ed. 1970).
37. D. OGmviE, CoNFEssioNs OF AN ADVERTISING MAN 59 (1966).
38. A. F=EY & J. HALTERm-AN, supra note 36, at 483.
39. See Moodie, Organizing the Communications Effort, 28 PUB.
REL. J., Nov., 1972, at 20.
40. Grass, Measuring Corporate Image Advertising Effects, 12 3. AD-
VERTsnG RESEAicH, Dec., 1972, at 15-22, relates research done on duPont
advertising, concludes that the campaign increased "favorability," but
does not suggest what benefit duPont received from this "favorability."
In the early fifties, the A & P supermarket chain, faced with an antitrust
suit, enlisted extensive popular support. The results of the litigation
were favorable to A & P, but not necessarily because of this public sup-
port. See G. FLANAGAN, supra note 5, at 23, which suggests that the ad-
vertising did influence the outcome of the case.
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consumer's buying decision.41 This assumption has been criti-
cized for lack of proof, as there have been no empirical studies
supporting it. But by the same token there is no empiri-
cal data disproving it. 4 2 There is at best a subjective feeling
within the advertising industry that advertising must sell more
than the product-it must sell the company responsible for the
product. 43
In addition to the ground that the image is not relevant, cor-
porate image advertising is also criticized as ineffective on the
ground that advertising by itself cannot create an image. Adver-
tising can only build upon reality.44 If not supported by reality,
the image advertising will merely aggravate distrust and cyni-
cism.45
The effectiveness of issue-oriented advertising is even more
speculative. Either because this form of corporate image adver-
tising has been relatively uncommon or because it is not ex-
pected to have any impact beyond dissemination alone, the ad-
vertising industry apparently has not addressed the subject of
its monetary effectiveness.
While the effectiveness of corporate image advertising is the
subject of some disagreement, even among advertisers them-
41. Martineau, supra note 6, at 58. However, Finn, supra note 20,
argues that the connection between the image and the purchasing deci-
sion is not well established. Cf. Geist, Confessions of an Ad Manager,
93 DuN's REVww, April, 1969, at 54:
Advertising has one purpose: to help sell a company's product
or capabilities. There is no valid distinction between promotion
of products and corporate image-which just means reputation
for reliability. A customer buys both, or he buys neither.
42. J. HowAiD & J. SHET., THE THEORY OF BuYER BEHAVIOR (1969)
is an in-depth study of the buying decision, but it does not treat the
producer's image at all. V. LEssIG, PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CON-
SUmE_ BUYING BEHAVIOR: A MuLTIDIiuENsIoNAL APPROACH 5-14 (1971) re-
views all the major buying studies of the past decade, none of which
have treated the relevance of the producer's image. At best, these stud-
ies indicate that a favorable brand image may be influential, but stop
short of equating brand image with producer image.
43. Geist, supra note 41, at 54. Companies Face An Identity Crisis,
Bus. WEEK, Feb. 20, 1971, at 54.
44. Berkwitt, Does the Corporate Image Really Change?, 95 DuN's
REVIEw, Jan., 1970, at 19.
45. Dalton, Corporate Advertising... "A Short Course in Bootstrap
Self-Improvement," 28 Pun. REL. J., Nov., 1972, at 67, suggests that image
advertising will encourage the company and its employees to be what
they are advertised to be. Whether or not in practical terms this will
happen is not clear. The effort to "clean up" the image may encourage
the corporation to "clean up" any obnoxious practices, but the evidence
for this proposition is sketchy.
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selves, 46 there is no indication that it is being abandoned. On
the contrary, the increasing reliance on corporate image adver-
tising is perhaps the strongest indication of its recognized effec-
tiveness.47
II. ADVERTISING UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Tim CoMmacL4 EXCEPTION
The doctrine that the protections of the first amendment do
not apply to commercial advertising was abruptly announced in
1942, in VaZentine v. Chrestensen.48 Citing no authority and dis-
cussing no public policy,49 the Court upheld a municipal sanita-
tion ordinance invoked to prohibit the distribution of a handbill
with both a political and a commercial message. The Court held
that states were free to regulate commercial advertising because
it was not speech within the meaning of the first amendment.5"
In reaching this result, the Court was not troubled by the hand-
bill's purported political message, because it had been included
on the handbill "with the intent, and for the purpose, of evading
46. See Advertising Age, May 21, 1973, at 20, col. 1; Advertising
Age, Nov. 15, 1971, at 3, col. 3.
47. See note 2 supre. See also, B. ZOLLO, supra note 10, at 2-3.
48. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939),
which reversed, on first amendment grounds, several convictions under
municipal ordinances regulating the distribution of handbills, the Court
may have been indicating the pattern of things to come. The Court
stated, as dictum, that: "We are not to be taken as holding that commer-
cial soliciting and canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation as
the ordinance [in that case] requires." Id. at 165.
49. Justice Douglas, concurring in Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) stated that:
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54, held that business ad-
vertisements and commercial matters did not enjoy the protec-
tion of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth. The ruling was casual, almost offhand. And
it has not survived reflection.
50. 316 U.S. at 54-55. Although not protected as speech under the
first amendment, advertising is protected as property under the four-
teenth amendment. T. EumsoN, ToWARD A GENERAL THEoRY Or THE FIRST
AMENDmENT 105 n.46 (1966) [hereinafter cited as EmERsoN, GENEAL
THEORY]; Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commer-
cial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
429, 430 (1971). Prior to Chrestensen, regulation of advertising had been
treated solely as a due process issue. See Packer v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105(1932); Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911). While
Chrestensen dealt strictly with" the mode of dissemination, the doctrine
has been extended to permit the regulation of advertising content as well.
E.F. Drewl & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 739 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied
352 U.S. 969 (1957); American Medicinal Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 136 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1943); T. EmERSON, THE SYSTEM or FREEDOM or EXPRESSION
417 (1970) [hereinafter cited as EmERsoN, SYSTEm].
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the prohibition of the ordinance." 51 Thus the Court obliquely
enunciated a primary-purpose test for determining if an adver-
tisement is commercial and thus subject to regulation.
The primary-purpose test was expanded in Breard v. City of
Alexandria,52 in which the Court upheld an ordinance prohibit-
ing salesmen from canvassing a community house-to-house for
magazine subscriptions. Although the issue of freedom of the
press was raised, the Court concluded that the purpose of sell-
ing magazine subscriptions was primarily commercial and the
activities were therefore not protected.5 3 This conclusion might
imply that freedom of speech is protected only until it is used to
obtain a financial return. However, later cases have made it
clear that because the exercise of free speech is in some circum-
stances dependent on a financial return, the presence of a com-
mercial transaction alone is not enough to deny first amendment
protection. 54 Thus, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 5 an ad-
vertisement soliciting support for the civil rights movement was
held to be protected speech even though it sought financial con-
tributions as well as moral support. The Court stated:
The publication here was not a "commercial" advertisement in
the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It com-
municated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances,
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of
the highest public interest and concern.5 0
51. 316 U.S. at 55.
52. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
53. Id. at 642.
54. EmmsoN, SYsTEm, supra note 50, at 416-17, citing Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959). In Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498, 514 (1959), Justice Douglas stated, in a concurring opinion:
"Those who make their living through exercise of First Amendment
rights are no less entitled to its protection than those whose advocacy or
promotion is not hitched to a profit motive." See also, Comment, The
First Amendment and Commercial Advertising: Bigelow v. Common-
wealth, 60 VA. L. Rnv. 154, 158 (1974).
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56. Id. at 266. The court did not make clear the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial advertising, and the quoted passage can
be read to mean either that the advertisement was not commercial and
it addressed an issue of "the highest public issue and concern," or that
the advertisement was not commercial because it addressed a public is-
sue. Justice Brennan recited several elements of the advertisement, stat-
ing that it "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited griev-
ances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support," but he
did not indicate whether those elements are decisive or merely descrip-
tive. Id. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1029 n.16 (1967).
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Although the impact of New York Times was to constitution-
ally exempt comment about official conduct from libel actions,57
the opinion suggests a general rule that advertising which com-
ments upon "matters of the highest public interest and concern"
is noncommercial. This approach to distinguishing commercial
and noncommercial advertising was apparently adopted in Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations."8
In holding that the states can constitutionally prohibit job ad-
vertisements that state a sex preference, the Court stated:
We emphasize that nothing in our holding allows government at
any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to publish and distribute
advertisements commenting on the Ordinance, the enforcement
practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex preference
in employment.5 9
Although this was dictum, the Court clearly recognized that the
commercial exception doctrine does not remove all advertising
from first amendment protection. While other factors may also
be involved, the expression of opinion on a public issue is a fac-
tor common to both New York Times and the Pittsburgh Press
dictum.
B. APPLICATION TO CORPORATE IMAGE ADVERTISING
Sales-oriented corporate image advertising serves the func-
tion of improving the advertiser's image and thus of promoting
an economic benefit such as sales revenue. For the same reasons
that product advertising can be regulated, there is little doubt
that corporate image advertising oriented solely toward an eco-
57. Subsequent libel cases have delineated a large "public concern"
exemption under the first amendment. Julian Messner, Inc. v. Spahn,
18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1966), vacated per
curiam, 387 U.S. 239 (1967) (broadening the scope of New York Times
to include "public figures"); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (in-
cluding "newsworthy items" under the New York Times rule); Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (expanding the rule to
cover matters of "public or general concern"); Getz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974) (overruling Rosenbloom, holding that public issues
are not covered by the New York Times rule).
58. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
59. Id. at 391. Plaintiff newspaper argued that because it exercised
"editorial discretion" over the placement of want-ads, the activity was
more than strictly commercial. The Court rejected this argument, and
the decision of the Court on this matter can be read as a determination
either that the alleged "editorial discretion" did not exist, or more prob-
ably, that it was insufficient to offset the primarily commercial nature
of the activity. Cf. Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S. Ct. 2831
(1974) (right-to-reply statute struck down as an infringement on "edi-
torial discretion." See text accompanying notes 166-69 infra).
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nomic benefit is not protected by the first amendment.6 0 The
problem arises with issue-oriented advertising, which seeks to
provide the advertiser a means to speak out on public issues."'
In the light of the guidance presently available, it appears that
such corporate image advertising would be outside the first
amendment's protection and subject to regulation if and only if
it is regarded as "commercial. ' 62
1. Tests for Commercial Content
Recent commentators have suggested a "marketplace" test
for distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial ad-
vertising and thus delimiting the commercial exception doc-
trine.63  Starting from the proposition that protection should be
60. The same conclusion was reached by FTC Chairman Lewis A.
Engman in a speech to the Antitrust Section of the State Bar of Michigan
on Feb. 17, 1974. Mr. Engman concluded: "[T]o the extent that such
[corporate image] ads like product ads, seek to ... encourage economic
responses ... they are subjects of legitimate interest to the Federal
Trade Commission" 5 TRADE REG. REP. f1 50,200, at 55,377 (FTC 1974).
FTC Consumer Protection Bureau Director J. Thomas Rosch, responding
to a request by certain congressmen that the FTC investigate oil com-
pany advertising, concluded: "Nevertheless, I think that the First
Amendment cannot be used as a shield when that garb is simply a sham
and the advertiser is actually intending to sell his product through unfair
or false advertising .... " 646 BNA AN.rmusT TRADE REG. REP. A-11
to -12 (Jan. 15, 1974).
61. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
62. There are no cases specifically dealing with the application of
the commercial exception doctrine to corporate image advertising. The
problem of regulating advertising in which a social issue is included in
the context of a commercial message is presented by two recent cases
dealing with the advertising of abortion referral agencies. In Mitchell
Family Planning, Inc. v. Royal Oak, 335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1972),
it was held that the advertising in question did not pose a "clear and
present danger" that the city policy against abortion would be violated.
See Comment, Constitutional Law-The First Amendment and Advertis-
ing: The Effects of the "Commercial Activity" Doctrine on Media Regu-
lation, 51 N.C.L. REv. 581 (1973). In Bigelow v. Virginia, 213 Va. 191,
191 S.E.2d 173 (1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 909, aff'd on rehearing, 214 Va.
341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973), a misdemeanor conviction for violation of an
ordinance prohibiting advertising for abortions was upheld because the
advertising was outside the first amendment. See Comment, supra note54. In neither case did the court address the utility of the advertising
in the social debate on abortion. For a discussion of the uses of commer-
cial advertising as a vehicle of free debate, see Redish, supra note 50,
at 443. See also text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.
63. Bird, Goldman & Lawrence, Corporate Image Advertising: A
Discussion of the Factors that Distinguish Those Corporate Image Adver-
tising Practices Protected Under the First Amendment from Those Sub-ject to Control by the Federal Trade Commission, 51 J. UJUAW L, 405
(1974).
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presumed unless specified conditions are met, this test permits
regulation only if the corporate image advertising makes state-
ments about the advertiser's business and these statements have
an appreciable influence on consumers in the market place. This
test has the advantage of certainty. It also has the advantage
of being supported by current regulatory practice.6 4 However,
even assuming that it is possible to determine when the requisite
conditions are satisfied, the test nonetheless is not sufficiently
flexible to apply to all the variations of use in which corporate
image advertising may be employed. Essential to this test is the
assumption that in any one advertisement there is no overlap of
the sales-oriented and issue-oriented purposes served by corpo-
rate image advertising. To the extent that public issues can be
addressed by the advertiser to improve its position in the mar-
ket, and efforts to improve market position can raise issues of
importance to public decision making, the test is inadequate.6 5
A second possible method of drawing a line between the
commercial and the noncommercial is to focus on the adverti-
ser's intent. Where an economic benefit is intended, the adver-
tisement would be commercial, regardless of what issues it ad-
dresses. Any method concerned with intent, however, involves
obvious problems of proof,66 especially in the case of corporate
image advertising where different messages can be intended for
different audiences. 67 Furthermore, what is intended and what
actually results are not necessarily synonymous, for a message
may be misunderstood or rejected. In order to reflect reality,
an inquiry should look beyond intent.
To the extent that this economic-benefit test rests on a find-
ing of benefit reasonably expected, rather than primarily in-
64. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra
note 56, at 1031-32. The FTC's power to prevent the dissemination of
a pamphlet which erroneously asserts that the use of aluminum cook-
ware is unsafe has been held to turn on the presence of a commercial
interest in dissemination. Compare Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d
640 (3d Cir. 1941) (cease and desist order set aside because the respond-
ent had no commercial interest in the sale of cookware) with Perma-
Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941) (cease and desist order
enforced with respect to dissemination of the same pamphlet because re-
spondent had a commercial interest in the sale of non-aluminum cook-
ware).
65. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
66. Significantly, the FTC has long considered intent immaterial,
partly because of the problem of proof. See Kintner, Federal Trade
Commission Regulation of Advertising, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1269, 1280
(1966).
67. See Brouillard, supra note 26, at 3.
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tended, the test becomes too inclusive. Because of the expense
involved in advertising, only a most atypical advertiser would
not expect to derive at least some economic benefit from the ex-
penditure. But it might not be appropriate to deny first amend-
ment protection to otherwise political speech in the form of paid
advertising simply because it is connected with an economic
benefit. If, for example, the Court in New York Times had con-
sidered the ultimate economic benefits of better jobs, improved
education, and a higher living standard which the civil rights
movement sought, it might not have so easily found the adver-
tisement protected by the first amendment under a strict eco-
nomic-benefit test.6 8 It would seem that some measure of prox-
imity or directness between the advertisement and the resulting
benefit is required; therefore, this test merely replaces one line-
drawing problem with another.
A third possible method of distinguishing the commercial
from the noncommercial is to develop the New York Times hold-
ing into a rule that advertising which addresses "matters of the
highest public interest and concern" is protected by the first
amendment. 9 However, if social commentary is sufficient to in-
voke first amendment protection, an advertiser would arguably
be able to use any public issue as a shield for his advertise-
ment.70 To forestall such use of incidental social commentary,
something more than mere association with a public issue must
be required or the rule would allow "every merchant who de-
sires to broadcast advertising ... to achieve immunity from the
law's command."7 1 Although the test could turn on such distin-
guishing factors as magnitude of the issue, weight of the treat-
ment given, or purpose for making the advertisement,7 2 evalua-
68. See Comment, supra note 54, at 158.
69. See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra.
70. For example, the advertiser in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942), appended a political protest against city wharfage policy
to his handbill in an attempt to evade the ordinance against disseminat-
ing commercial handbills. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
71. 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942). For example, the Chevron commercials
of Standard Oil of California associated the product and its ingredient
F-310 with the public concern about pollution. It would be hard tojustify a policy which would not permit FTC intervention merely be-
cause pollution is discussed. Berman, Chevrons Pollution Solution,
COmmoNWEAL, Mar. 5, 1971, at 547, uses the Chevron commercial as an
example of the exploitation of environmental awareness by business:
The red-eyed, smog-filled viewer is told that big companies are
more concerned with "saving the environment" than making a
fast buck and that he can help the problem along by succumbing
to conspicuous consumption of all salable items that promise to
help avert the coming environmental crisis.
72. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
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tion of those factors might also be difficult and might admit of
application only on a case-by-case basis.
This public interest test would encounter a further difficulty
because the criteria for "matters of the highest public interest and
concern" are not always clear. A specific definition of public is-
sues might prove unworkable, because issues change constantly
and are not uniform throughout the nation. However, a broad
definition may not be precise enough to forewarn advertisers of
the scope of regulation.
73
2. A Balancing Approach
To avoid some of the difficulties involved in a test for com-
mercial content, it should be recognized that the characterization
of an advertisement as "commercial" or "noncommercial" is a
conclusion of law-simply another way of indicating whether
regulation is considered appropriate. Thus the best "test" is one
which identifies the respective interests involved and denomi-
nates "commercial"--and thus subject to regulation-that ad-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973), may anticipate such a possibility. See
also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
73. Jones, The Cultural and Social Impact of Advertising on Ameri-
can Society, 8 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 65, 74 (1970) states that any product
advertising, to be effective, "of necessity must replay or reflect some cul-
tural aspects of our society...." If such implicit social commentary
were held sufficient to constitute a first amendment defense, the com-
mercial exception doctrine would be defunct. This result could be
avoided by an admission that the social commentary in the average prod-
uct advertisement does not approach an issue of "public interest and con-
cern," as the term was apparently used in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). However, in Friends of the Earth v. FCC,
449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court observed that the application
of the "fairness doctrine" was triggered by advertisements extolling the
desirability of big automobiles. Although the advertisements themselves
were silent as to the effect of large engines on the environment, they
did affect social value judgments concerning clean air and pollution. See
Comment, The Fairness Doctrine Requires Rebuttal to Air Pollution Poli-
cies Implicitly Espoused by Car and Gasoline Commercials, 50 Tmx. L.
REv. 500 (1972).
Similarly, in reference to the FTC's proposal to regulate "nonra-
tional" advertising, one writer has stated:
Since television occupies a central place in most households, the
viewer is continuously engulfed with messages which educate,
messages which set standards, and messages which instill drives.
Attitudes and life styles are most certainly influenced by the
medium. Thus, the importance of understanding the new televi-
sion advertising, as well as new advertising in general, cannot
be overemphasized.
Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising-The FTC Response, 26 FooD
DRUG Cosm. L.J. 609, 622 (1971).
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vertisement for which the interests in regulation outweigh the
interests in protection.
The interest of the advertiser in being heard originates in
the preferred place of speech in our society; it is reflected in the
protection accorded to speech by the first amendment. That in-
terest is reinforced by the fact that the advertiser bears the ex-
pense of being heard. A monetary interest alone, however, does
not warrant first amendment protection; cases such as New York
Times indicate some of the nonmonetary interests that might be
sufficient to invoke such protection.74
To the advertiser's interest should be added the communi-
ty's interest in hearing all sides of important public questions.75
This interest is not served, however, by the dissemination of false
facts,76 although it might be served by the dissemination of er-
roneous ideas. Consequently, corporate image advertising which
supports its message with erroneous factual information would
not perform a function protected by the first amendment and
theoretically would deserve protection only to the extent that
it is a factually correct statement.77 In practice, the distinction
between factual assertions and opinion is not always clear. As
the Supreme Court stressed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,78
74. See note 56 supra.
75. See generally Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute,
1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245; Redish, supra note 50, at 434-36.
76. See Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3007 (1974), in
which the Court stated:
But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 270 .... They belong to that category of utterances
which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the so-
cial interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 ... (1942).
Gertz, however, was a libel action and thus not entirely on point. The
extent to which its analysis can be transferred to the different interests
involved in advertising is speculative. Cf. Redish, supra note 50, at 459,
which argues that libel suits and FTC regulation cannot be equated be-
cause the "chilling effect" of libel is greater.
77. As an illustration, Mobil Oil Company has asserted that as only
one oil well in sixty pays off, higher gasoline prices and larger corporate
profits are needed to develop more sources of oil. Figures compiled for
the American Petroleum Institute indicate that three out of five new
wells are productive. See Minneapolis Star, Apr. 25, 1974, § B, at 30,
col. 1. While a corporation's claims that higher profits are justified is
perhaps protected, the use of erroneous factual material to support these
claims would not be.
78. 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
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"Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of con-
stitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free de-
bate."701 Drawing a distinction between factual statements and
opinion in an advertisement might present difficulties, and the
result is likely to be a case-by-case approach to the problem.80
Because the Supreme Court has not subjected the commer-
cial exception doctrine to a searching analysis, it has not clearly
identified the interests served by regulation. Commentators
have suggested several justifications for regulating advertising,8 1
but only in the context of product advertising, not corporate im-
age advertising. The first of these justifications is that false ad-
vertising, unlike erroneous ideas, does not address matters of
public importance and therefore does not deserve a forum. 2
Thus, corporate image advertising which does address a matter
of public importance would apparently deserve protection, re-
gardless of any accompanying commercial motive, message, or
effect. Under regulations supported by this justification the
identification of matters of public interest again becomes the
crux of the problem. 8
A second justification for regulating advertising is that
while erroneous ideas may contribute to the intellectual process,
false product advertising adds nothing to the product.8 4 To the
extent that issue-oriented corporate image advertising contrib-
utes to the intellectual process then, it would not seem correct to
encroach upon the advertiser's freedom of speech. However, this
will present no obstacle to the regulation of false factual asser-
tions, which do not contribute to the intellectual process.8 5
79. Id. at 3007.
80. The restriction of regulation to matters of factual assertions is
supported by a phenomenon peculiar to corporate image advertising. The
credibility of an advertisement is determined by the factual assertions
made to support it. Unless the advertisement is supported by facts, it
will not be believed. As a practical matter, then, regulation of factual
assertions alone would be sufficient to control abuse of corporate image
advertising. See Day, Closing the Credibility Gap in Environmental
Control, Bus. MGMT., June, 1971, at 29, 36. In the context of product
advertising, Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Adver-
tising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 445 (1964), argues that only factual claims
should be regulated; the FTC should not concern itself with an adver-
tisement's economic utility.
81. Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note
56, at 1029-31.
82. Id. at 1029-30.
83. See text accompanying notes 69-73 supra.
84. Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note
56, at 1030.
85. One justification for subjecting advertising to a "test of trut h'
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Finally, it is suggested that advertising should be regulated
to protect the consumer who would otherwise be unable to dis-
cover deception until after he has been injured by purchasing
an inferior, advertised product.86 Arguably, the consumer
should be protected against inferior ideas in the same manner he
is protected against inferior goods, but there is no mechanism for
securing such "protection" in a free society. Accordingly, this
justification for regulation does not appear to have much rele-
vance to corporate image advertising of the issue-oriented vari-
ety.
In view of all the interests involved in the application of the
commercial exception doctrine to corporate image advertising, it
would appear that the factual claims made in image advertising
could be regulated without transgressing first amendment guar-
antees, but that there is no corresponding justification for the
regulation of ideas. This is consistent with the basic objective of
advertising regulation, which is to protect the consumer against
false or deceptive claims, not to censor advertisers' "incorrect"
ideas.
III. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
A. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the FTC is limited by the requirements
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act that the acts
or practices regulated be "in commerce" and that "a proceeding
by [the FTC] in respect thereof would be to the interest of the
public .... -87 The requirement that the acts or practices be
in contrast to the general rule that truth is immaterial to first amend-
ment protection of speech is the greater susceptibility of advertising
claims to factual verification. See id. at 1030-31.
86. See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78
I-I.v. L. REv. 1191, 1197 (1965).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 26, 1914,
ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 92) reads in pertinent part:
(b) Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that
any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using
any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or
practice in commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission
that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest
of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, partner-
ship, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that re-
spect and containing a notice of a hearing upon a day and at
a place therein fixed at least thirty days after the service of said
complaint.
A bill currently pending in Congress would expand the FTC's juris-
diction in the area of consumer protection. See H.R. 7917, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973). Reported to the House floor in H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d
Cong., 2d Sss. (1974),
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"in commerce" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
deny the FTC jurisdiction over wholly intrastate sales. In FTC
v. Bunte Brothers,88 the Court held as a matter of statutory con-
struction that because section 5 specifies activities "in com-
merce," rather than "affecting commerce," Congress intended to
grant to the FTC only part of its broad constitutional power
over commerce. 89 Although the sales of candy in Bunte Broth-
ers admittedly "affected" interstate commerce, they did not meet
the stricter "in commerce" requirement and the FTC was with-
out jurisdiction.
While Bunte Brothers has not been directly challenged, and
other federal courts have upheld the distinction,9" its author-
ity seems to be in doubt.9 1 It has been suggested that the only
reason the Bunte Brothers distinction has survived is that the
FTC is discouraged for practical reasons from attempting to ex-
pand the limits of its jurisdiction. 9 2 The FTC has, however, as-
serted jurisdiction over local sellers who advertise by means of
interstate media,9" but this assertion has not been tested in the
courts. 4 In Guziak v. FTC,9 r the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that an aluminum siding vendor who advertised
through interstate media and effected a minimal number of in-
terstate sales was "in commerce" for the purposes of section 5.
The court stressed that there was no "basis ... for holding that
the Commission may not assert its power until the interstate ac-
tivity under scrutiny has reached a certain magnitude. 98 This
is not to say, however, that advertising in interstate commerce
alone would be sufficiently "in commerce," and the court seems
to suggest that at least one interstate sale would be required.
While interstate advertising alone may not be enough to sup-
port jurisdiction, the FTC would have jurisdiction if the adver-
88. 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
89. Id. at 355
90. See, e.g., Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959)
(intrastate commerce not subject to federal regulation even though it
may competitively affect interstate commerce); California Rice Indus. v.
FTC, 102 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1939) (fixing quotas of rice to be milled
"affected" but not "in" interstate commerce).
91. Millstein, supra note 80, at 455-56.
92. Id. at 456.
93. S. Klein Dep't Stores, 57 F.T.C. 1543 (1960).
94. Bankers Sec. Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961) held that
the FTC had jurisdiction where both interstate delivery of goods and
advertising in interstate newspapers had occurred. Jurisdiction may
conceivably rest on either ground.
95. 361 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1966).
96. Id. at 703.
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tiser carries on interstate sales as well. Corporate image adver-
tising could create special jurisdictional problems, as by defini-
tion this type of advertising is designed to sell ideas rather than
products.9 7 There is no requirement, however, that the regu-
lated advertising be the cause of the interstate sales, and all
corporate image advertising of any corporation with interstate
sales could thus be subject to regulation. On the other hand,
the corporate image advertiser who conducts no interstate busi-
ness presumably would not advertise in interstate commerce, or
even if he did, would not advertise enough to justify regula-
tion.98 As a practical matter, the FTC would thus have juris-
diction over all significant corporate image advertising.
The requirement of section 5 that regulation be in the public
interest has also been interpreted to limit FTC jurisdiction. 9 In
FTC v. Klesner,00 the FTC sought to enforce an order prohibiting
the respondent from using the name "Shade Shop," as another
business had adopted the name. The Court held that without a
showing of a specific substantial public interest, the FTC lacked
authority to file a complaint.10 1 Recent judicial treatment of the
question of public interest, however, has tended to respect the
discretion of the FTC.' -0 2 The Supreme Court has not ruled spe-
cifically on FTC discretion, but in a trade name dispute similar
to Klesner it has held that another administrative agency, the
Civil Aeronautics Board, has wide discretion in determining what
is a matter of public interest.10 3 I t is very unlikely that a court
97. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
98. Such speculation could be avoided if section 5 were simply
amended to provide for jurisdiction on the basis of interstate advertising
alone. See note 87 supra.
99. Millstein, supra note 80, at 483-84.
100. 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
101. Id. at 30. Judge Friendly suggests that this case can be inter-
preted in one of two ways. It may mean literally that the FTC cannot
intervene in private disputes, or it may be read merely as an expression
of judicial disgust with the FTC for pursuing cases of no real or economic
impact. See Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 877 (2d Cir.
1961) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962).
102. In Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942),
Judge Learned Hand distinguished Klesner on grounds that it "is to be
put down as deciding that the court may consider whether the contro-
versy is not in general too trivial to justify the attention of the Commis-
sion." See Milistein, supra note 80, at 483; Developments in the Law-
Deceptive Advertising, supra note 56, at 1023. See also Exposition Press,
Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962);
Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 323 U.S. 753 (1944); L & C Mayers, Inc. v. FTC, 97 F.2d 365 (2d
Cir. 1938).
103. American Airlines, Inc, v. Worth An. Airlin.es, Inc., 851 U.S. 79
(1956?,
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would rule corporate image advertising outside the FTC's juris-
diction for lack of a public interest in regulation.
0 4
Corporate image advertising is not otherwise excluded from
the intended scope of section 5. Although in general the legisla-
tive intent of the original Act of 1914 is anything but clear, the
broad language of section 5 evidently was chosen to give the
new Commission wide powers and the ability to adapt the defi-
nition of "unfair methods of competition" to changing circum-
stances. 105 The Wheeler-Lea Act' 0 6 amended the FTC Act in 1938
to allow the Commission to regulate in the interest of the consu-
mer as well as in the interest of competition, and its legislative
history indicates that the regulation of false advertising was in-
tended.1 0 7  There is nothing to indicate that Congress had any
particular type of false advertising in mind or that it sought to
exempt any particular type. The language of the Act and the
broad congressicnal approval given FTC efforts to regulate ad-
vertising compel the conclusion that the scope of the FTC's au-
thority is broad enough to include corporate image advertising. 0 8
For several reasons, as a matter of practice the FTC has lim-
ited its regulation almost solely to product advertising. The
amount of corporate image advertising is insignificant in relation
to product advertising. 10 9 The latter type of advertising has also
represented a greater potential for injury both to the consumer
104. Millstein, supra note 80, at 484. The FTC's decision to actually
assert jurisdiction and to regulate corporate image advertising, however,
would involve a different set of considerations. See text accompanying
notes 109-11 infra.
105. S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914); H.R. REP. No.
1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1914). Power to regulate advertising
as an "unfair method of competition" was asserted by the Commission
in 1916 in its annual report: "[I]n certain cases of misbranding and
falsely advertising the character of goods where the public was particu-
larly liable to be misled, the Commission has taken jurisdiction." 1916
FTC ANN. REP. 6. This assertion of jurisdiction was apparently not in-
tended by the framers of the Act. See Millstein, supra note 80, at 450.
Nevertheless, the court upheld the FTC's jurisdiction over advertising in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919). Accord FTC
v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 255 U.S. 483 (1922).
106. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, amending 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970)).
107. Senator Wheeler, reporting the Wheeler-Lea Act on the floor of
the Senate, stated: "The Federal Trade Commission has always had ju-
risdiction over false advertising of foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics,
as well as over all other commodities." 83 CONG. RIc. 325,5 (1938).
108. See id. at 3255-56. But see Bird, Goldman & Lawrence, supra
note 63, at 414-15.
109. See note 2 supra,
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and to ,conmpetition because it is a direct inducement to buy.110
Finally, the claims of product advertising are more readily sus-
ceptible of verification."' However, while the FTC has accord-
ingly concentrated its finite resources on product advertising,
this cannot be regarded as abdication of jurisdiction over corpo-
rate image advertising.
Precedent supporting jurisdiction over corporate image ad-
vertising is supplied by cases in which the FTC has successfully
exerted regulation over misrepresentations of matters extrinsic
to the product itself. It has long been recognized as an unfair
practice for a seller to represent himself as a manufacturer
when in fact he does not manufacture, or for a seller to misrep-
resent the origin of his wares.1 2 The rationale is not that the
misrepresented goods are somehow inferior; rather, it is that a
consumer should be free to exercise his preference for manu-
facturers over jobbers, or for the products of one country over
those of another."5  The same rationale can be extended to cor-
porate image advertising to the extent that it is used by the
advertiser to improve its image and thereby promote sales. The
consumer who chooses to form product preferences on the basis
of the policies or practices of the producer should be free to ex-
ercise this choice.
B. RATIONALE OF REGULATION
Before 1938, the only approach to the regulation of advertis-
ing available to the FTC under section 5 was to find the advertis-
ing an "unfair method of competition." Such a finding required
a demonstration of some injury to competition.1 4 Since this pre-
cluded regulation where there was no competition, or where all
competitors alike engaged in the practice,"15 Congress amended
section 5 to place protection of consumers on a common level
110. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
111. Note, supra note 86, at 1197.
112. Barnes, The Law of Trade Practices-lI: False Advertising, 23
OHio ST. L.J. 597, 618 (1962).
113. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 388 (1965); FTC
v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934); FTC v. Royal Milling
Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933).
114. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931) (FTC powerless to
act unless injury to competition can be shown); Millstein, supra note
80, at 453. The passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act has made regulation
by the "unfair method of competition" approach obsolete. See text ac-
companying note 106 supra.
115. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931) (no injury to compe-
tition because there was no competition).
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with protection of competition." 6  The Wheeler-Lea Act added
to section 5 the phrase "unfair or deceptive act or practice.""17
This amendment has provided the FTC with the alternatives of
finding advertising "deceptive""18 or "unfair."
1. Deceptive Practices
The determination that an advertisement is deceptive is a
four step operation. First, in order to establish some parameters
of what is deceptive or potentially deceptive, it is necessary to
establish an intelligence level against which the advertisement
can be measured."19 As a rule, an intelligence level somewhat
below that of the "reasonable man" of tort law is employed,12 0
because regulation is designed to protect "the credulous as well
as the wary."1' 2' Second, it is necessary to determine what the
advertisement means, or what promise is made, with reference to
116. See 83 CoNG. REc. 3256 (1938) (remarks of Senator Wheeler).
117. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, amending 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1970)). See text
accompanying note 106 supra.
118. See Jentz, Federal Regulation of Advertising: False Represen-
tation of Composition, Character, or Source and Deceptive Television
Demonstrations, 6 Am. Bus. L.J. 409, 416-17 (1968).
119. Millstein, supra note 80, at 457-65.
120. Note, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of FTC Regula-
tion, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1097, 1100.
121. Charles of the Ritz Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir.
1944). Thain, supra note 73, at 615, suggests that the FTC will seek to
adjust the intelligence level against which the advertisement will bejudged for cases involving special groups such as children, the elderly,
or the handicapped, who can be expected to be particularly vulnerable
to certain kinds of claims. See text accompanying note 145 infra.
Where special audiences are not involved, the low level at which
the intelligence standard is set has elicited criticism on grounds that it is
wasteful and makes the FTC "look fairly foolish in this business of pro-
tecting fools," Alexander, Federal Regulation of False Advertising, 17
U. KAx. L. Rsv. 573 (1969), and on constitutional grounds because an
intelligence level set this low denies the advertiser freedom of speech,
Millstein, supra note 80, at 492.
In Heinz v. Kirchner, [1961-63 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,664, at 21,540 (FTC 1963) the Commission stated: "A representa-
tion does not become 'false and deceptive' merely because it will be
unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and unrepresentative
segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is addressed."
However, in ITT Continental Baking Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. f 20,464(FTC 1973) the Commission, in reviewing a Wonder Bread advertise-
ment, noted that although "most people above age six might view the
literal message of the 'fantasy growth sequence' with skepticism," this
would not prevent a finding that the advertisement had a potential for
deceiving others. See also Eastern Detective Academy, Inc., [1970-73
Transfer Binder] TRADE REa. REP. 1 19,727 (FTC 1971) (reaffirmation
that the law protects the credulous as well as the wary).
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the selected intelligence level. Current practice is for the FTC to
make this determination, 22 and the courts with rare exception
defer to the Commission's exipertise.' 23 Third, it must be deter-
mined if the message or promise is true. This determination
requires that the advertiser provide "substantial proof," both in
the Commission's proceedings and on review.1 24  Finally, the
false message or promise must be found to be material. The test
of materiality is whether the assertion is "capable of affecting
purchasing decisions."'125 In establishing materiality, it is not im-
portant to prove actual deception, but only that the advertise-
ment has the capacity to deceive.12 6 The finding of materiality
is also within FTC discretion.' 27
A determination that corporate image advertising is decep-
tive or potentially deceptive would thus follow the steps of selec-
tion of an intelligence level, interpretation of the advertisement
to determine the promise made, evaluation of this promise for
truthfulness, and assessment of the materiality of any untruth.
This procedure has been employed for product advertising and
should be feasible for similar, sales-oriented corporate image ad-
vertising. Indeed, the FTC has dealt with closely analogous sit-
uations in cases involving misrepresentation of extrinsic mat-
ters.1 28 Cases involving misrepresentation of status are particu-
larly relevant, as there is little difference between a seller who
seeks to induce consumer confidence by misrepresenting his
status and a corporation which seeks the same end by misrepre-
senting, for example, its concern with the environment. 29
122. Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception before the Federal
Tra'e Commissivn, 17 U. KAN. L. REv. 559, 565 (1969); Millstein, supra
note 80, at 465, 470; Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising,
80 HIhv. L. REv. 1005, 1043 (1967). Gellhorn in particular criticizes the
failure to use market surveys to determine what the advertisement
means. Failure to use surveys and minimal reliance on expert testimony
results in the advertisement meaning what the FTC says it means. Mill-
stein, supra note 80, at 470. The Commission allowed the admission of
market surveys in ITT Continental Baking Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
20,464, at 20,377 (FTC 1973), but made no effort to conduct its own.
123. Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
1025 (1957).
124. Millstein, supra note 80, at 478-83.
125. Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note
122, at 1056.
126. Millstein, supra note 80, at 485.
127. FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 49 (1965). See also
Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 122, at
1056.
128. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
129. See text accompanying notes 112-13 supra,
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There might be difficulty in determining that the misrepresenta-
tion is material, because the inducement of image advertising is
indirect. Liberal criteria of materiality may be justified on the
ground that all sales-oriented advertising is necessarily intended
to induce consumer action, and a conclusion that the false state-
ment is "capable of affecting purchasing decisions" therefore con-
forms to the presumed intent with which the statement is
made.330
Regulation of deceptive practices in issue-oriented corporate
image advertising might be more difficult because the correlation
between misrepresentation and inducement would typically be
more attenuated. In the assessment of materiality, it is assumed
that the induced action will be the purchase of a product or serv-
ice, or some other commercial act. However, if the misrepresen-
tation were allegedly material in a noncommercial sense, then
the simple approach to materiality would no longer be accept-
able; even if it is found that the statement is intended to induce
some type of social or political action, there is a difference be-
tween such action and a simple consumer purchase. The more
probable result would be that unless the representation were ma-
terial in a commercial sense, the advertisement would be pro-
tected by the first amendment.113
Of greater interest, however, is the problem of interpreting
the issue-oriented advertisement to determine its claim or prom-
ise. It is entirely conceivable that such an advertisement would
have two permissible interpretations, one involving interests pro-
tected by the first amendment and another involving interests
more appropriately subjected to regulation. Clearly, if the FTC
chooses between such interpretations in a seemingly arbitrary
manner,'132 without reference to the interests involved, and courts
of appeals continue to give only cursory review to the Commis-
sion's choices, 13 3 a possible result would be a holding by the Su-
preme Court or a declaration by Congress that the first amend-
ment precludes all regulation of issue-oriented advertising. The
FTC should develop internal safeguards to prevent such a result,
and courts of appeals should carefully enforce those safeguards.
130. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra
note 122, at 1056.
131. The absence of materiality points to a basic logical difficulty
in labeling an issue-oriented corporate image advertisement "deceptive."
If consumer purchase decisions are not affected, there appears to be no
deception. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive, Inc., 380 U.S. 374, 395 (1965)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. See note 122 supra.
133. See text accompanying note 123 supra. .
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2. Unfair Practices: The Unfairness Doctrine
The language added to section 5 by the Wheeler-Lea Act
makes "unfair... acts or practices" unlawful.3 4 This has be-
come the basis of an "unfairness doctrine" under which the FTC
exercises power to prohibit trade practices which are unfair to
consumers. This power was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Sperry & Hutchinson v. FTC .1-5 Respondent, the leader in the
trading stamps industry, sought to prevent trading in its stamps
except by its own franchises. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the FTC was without statutory power to declare
this practice "unfair." 36 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that section 5 did indeed contain such a grant of power. Al-
though the Court did not offer a precise definition of unfairness,
it suggested some general guidelines in a footnote to the opinion:
(1) whether the practice, without having been considered un-
lawful, offends public policy as it has been established by
statutes, the common law, or otherwise ... ; (2) whether it
is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether
it causes substantial injury to consumers .... 137
The Commission's approach to the problem of unfairness in
advertising is illustrated by its decision in the leading case of
Pfizer, Inc. 38 There the Conunission stated that an advertiser
who makes claims of product performance or safety without prior
substantiation of these claims is unfair to the consumer who is
expected to rely upon such representations. 39 Subsequent com-
ment by the FTC has made it clear that the unfairness doctrine
134. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, amending 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1970)) (emphasis
added). This is not the same as an "unfair method of competition," dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 114-18 supra, because there is no re-
quirement that competition or competitors be affected by the unfair prac-
tice.
135. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
136. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1970).
137. 405 U.S. at 244-45 n.5. This footnote quotes the FTC's "State-
ment of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or De-
ceptive Advertising and Labelling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking," 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964). See also Note, supra
note 120, at 1106-11, 1124. Cf. S. 3377, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (bill
to require standardization of product testing criteria).
138. Pfizer, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f 20,056(FTC 1972).
139. The complaint in Pfizer alleged that respondent advertised its
sunburn remedy, Un-Burn, without having tested it first. The complaint
was dismissed by the Commission, precluding judicial review. See Note,
Unfairness in Advertising: Pfizer, Inc., 55 VA. L. REV. 324, 340, 346 n.147(1973).
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applies to affirmative advertised claims for which the advertiser
does not have a "reasonable basis.' 40
To satisfy the reasonable basis requirement, the advertiser
must have evidence that would reasonably support the claim
made, and this evidence must be the product of reasonable meas-
ures to verify the claim.141 The first requirement is a factual is-
sue dependent upon such considerations as the specificity of the
claim, the type of product involved, the hazard posed if the claim
is false, the degree of consumer reliance placed on the claim, and
the type and accessibility of the evidence. While in Pfizer the
Commission indicated that something less than scientific studies
might be sufficient,142 later complaints issued by the FTC have
indicated that it might require claims to be supported by "compe-
tent scientific tests."' 43 The requirement that the advertiser
make reasonable efforts to obtain verification went undiscussed
in Pfizer. The extent of the reasonable efforts requirement
awaits precise definition, but it has been suggested that reason-
able efforts consist of well-documented testing by impartial
experts. 44
Application of the unfairness doctrine is not limited to ad-
vertising involving untruthfulness. For example, it has been ar-
gued that advertising which appeals primarily to vulnerable
groups such as children, the elderly, or the handicapped might be
unfair, even though not strictly deceptive.145 Similarly, adver-
tising which invokes irrelevant factors such as sex appeal, rather
than the objective utility of the product, has been questioned
140. Note, Pfizer Reasonable Basis Test-Fast Relief for Consumers
but a Headache for Advertisers, 1973 DuxE L.J. 563; Note, The FTC Ad
Substantiation Program, 61 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1430-31 (1973).
141. Note, supra note 139, at 339-42.
142. Pfizer, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,056,
at 22,036, 22,039 (FTC 1972).
143. See General Motors [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
20,120 (FTC 1972) (complaint issued Oct. 12, 1972, alleging failure to
substantiate claims made about the chassis of General Motors automo-
biles).
144. Note, supra note 139, at 339-42. See the FTC's "Resolution Re-
quiring Submission of Special Reports Relating to Advertising Claims
and Disclosure Thereof by the Commission," 36 Fed. Reg. 12,058 (1971).
145. Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising-the FTC Response,
26 FOOD DRuc Cosm. L.J. 609, 615 (1971). See also note 121 supra. The
most significant feature of this argument concerns limitations on adver-
tising for children. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Cana-
dian Broadcasting Company has decided to eliminate advertising on
children's programs by the end of 197 See 662 BNA ANTTUST TRADE
REG. REP. A-23 (May 7, 1974).
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as unfair because it does not give the consumer information on
which to base a rational buying decision.' 4 6
The FTC has begun a program requiring advertisers to sub-
mit to the FTC the material which allegedly supports their ad-
vertised claims.1 47 Originally, this was done to further the statu-
tory goal of informing the consumer by making this information
available to the publi. 48 It has not had much success in this
respect, however; there is a long delay between demand for the
material and its submission to the FTC,' 49 and when received,
much of the material is too bulky or technical to be of use to
the consumer. Furthermore, requiring this material to be sub-
mitted may have actually induced advertisers to forego factual
claims in favor of "mood" or "non-rational" claims and may have
thus produced the perverse effect of further reducing the infor-
mation available to the consumer.'8 " Conseque4tly, the FTC has
changed the purpose for requiring substantiation to one of en-
forcement; it now uses the submitted material to discover prod-
uct misrepresentations in the advertising.'51
To the extent that sales-oriented corporate image advertis-
ing resembles product advertising, the same standards of unfair-
ness are probably applicable. As these standards evolve in the
context of product advertising, they should furnish clearer guid-
ance for the regulation of sales-oriented corporate image adver-
tising as well.
Application of the unfairness doctrine to issue-oriented cor-
porate image advertising is more difficult. A threshold prob-
lem is the absence of any indication of what types of unfairness
are affected. If a distinction can be made between unfairness to
the consumer in his economic interests and unfairness in his non-
146. Note, supra note 120, at 1097.
147. Note, The FTC Ad Substantiation Program, supra note 140, at
1428.
148. Note, Pfizer Reasonable Basis Test-Fast Relief for Consumers
but a Headache for Advertisers, supra note 140, at 596; Note, supra note
139, at 336. The basis for a program of consumer education lies in the
avowed intent of Congress in passing the FTC Act to educate the public.
See ABA CommVn. To STuDY =u FgEAmL TRADE CoasvncsSioN 69-70 (1969).
149. The delay between submission of data and the issuance of com-
plaints based on deficiencies is another shortcoming of this program. See
Note, Pfizer Reasonable Basis Test-Fast Relief for Consumers But a
Headache for Advertisers, supra note 140, at 584-85.
150. Id.
151. See 645 BNA AN Ust TRzADE REa. REP. AA-1 (Jan. 8, 1974).
See also 86 BROADcASTn G, March 4, 1974, at 53 (FTC Bureau of Consumer
Protection Director, J. Thomas Rosch's proposal to require substantiation
of the meaning of the advertisement).
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economic interests, the question arises whether the FTC can reg-
ulate noneconomic unfairness. The Court's language in Sperry
& Hutchinson can be read to include broad noneconomic inter-
ests,15 2 but that language refers to the cigarette commercial ban,
which is based on the FTC's unquestioned power to prohibit acts
or practices injurious to the health or well-being of the public.
Thus, Sperry & Hutchinson sheds little light on the question of
the Commission's power to curb simple "unfairness" in general
noneconomic matters.
Even assuming a power in the FTC to regulate noneconomic,
issue-oriented corporate image advertising, the application of the
unfairness doctrine would still be difficult, because the meaning
of "unfairness" would still be in doubt. If, for example, the rea-
sonable basis test of Pfizer were interpreted to mandate a rea-
sonable factual basis for the opinions expressed in issue-oriented
advertising, the result would be a "chilling effect" on the adver-
tiser's freedom to state his opinions independent of any factual
basis. Application of the reasonable basis test only to the factual
assertions actually expressed might reduce the strain on the first
amendment, but this would still involve a cumbersome inquiry
into the issue of reasonable verification. That inquiry can be
avoided by adopting objective truthfulness of expressed asser-
tions as the standard for invoking the unfairness doctrine. This
is the standard presently used in the regulation of deceptive prac-
tices, but its proposed employment in the context of unfair prac-
tices would avoid the difficulty inherent in the deceptive prac-
tices approach-the difficulty of showing noneconomic material-
ity.153 A determination that incorrect factual assertions in a cor-
porate image advertisement were unfair rather than deceptive
would avoid the requirement of showing a causal relationship
to consumer action.
Regardless of the approach used, labelling an erroneous fac-
tual assertion "unfair" can imply that the entire advertisement
152. See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
153. See text accompanying note 131 supra. Cf. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. g 20,464 (FTC 1973), in which, in a com-
mercial context, the majority rejected an allegation of unfairness based
on deception. Believing the deceptive practices approach to be more ap-
propriate in that product-advertising case, the majority stated:
As complaint counsel develop their unfairness argument, it rests
almost entirely on the fact that the advertisements make false
promises rather than that they address themselves to particu-
larly vulnerable aspects of their audiences which might conceiv-
ably render even truthful messages unfair.
Id. at 20,382.
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is "unfair." Such an implication might appear to threaten the
advertiser's freedom of speech. The threat is greater when the
FTC enjoys wide discretion in the application of standards of un-
fairness. Thus an objective standard of factual accuracy should
be employed to diminish the threat to first amendment liberties.
The Commission should be careful not to impute a finding of un-
fairness to the entire advertisement, especially to the opinions or
conclusions expressed therein. If an opinion or conclusion nec-
essarily rests on a factual basis found to be "unfair," then it is dif-
ficult to avoid concluding that the opinion expressed is unfair.
But the policies of the first amendment would be best served if
such an inference were left to the public.
C. REMEDIES
In its regulation of advertising the FTC enjoys broad discre-
tion in the selection of remedies, limited only by the requirement
that the remedy selected must have a "reasonable relation to the
unlawful practices found to exist."'-5 4 The usual remedy for de-
ceptive or unfair advertising is the cease and desist order con-
templated by the FTC Act.155 That order has been criticized as
ineffective because it addresses only future dissemination of the
advertisement. Indeed, such an order does not take effect until
the proceedings are final, and in the interim the advertiser is
free to continue using the advertisement. 156 Often by the time
154. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957); accord Jacob
Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1964).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). See note 87 supra. See also Note,
The Pfizer Reasonable Basis Test-Fast Relief for Consumers but a
Headache for Advertisers, supra note 140, at 587.
156. The cause celebre of an advertiser dragging out a proceeding
while continuing to disseminate the allegedly deceptive advertising is
Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 884 (1959). See Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal
Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. COM. B.J. 548,
561-63 (1964). The grant of injunctive powers to the FTC should remedy
this defect to a certain degree. A temporary restraining order can be
granted
whenever the Commission has reason to believe-
(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating,
or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by
the Federal Trade Commission, and(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a
complaint by the Commission and until such complaint
is dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court
on review, or ... has become final, would be in the in-
terest of the public....
14 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1970). Injunctive relief has been granted in two
cases: Travel King, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,502 (FTC 1974) (pro-
motional practices of a "psychic surgery" tour to the Philippines); FTC
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the order becomes effective, the advertising campaign has ex-
pired of its own accord. 157 In any event, a cease and desist order
does not eliminate any residual effect which the advertising may
have generated. False impressions created by the advertisement
may well survive a cease and desist order.1 5 s
As a remedy for these shortcomings of cease and desist or-
ders, corrective advertising'5 9 was proposed during the litigation
of Campbell Soup Co. 16 Campbell's had been accused of using
marbles at the bottom of a bowl in a mock-up of its soup, so
that the soup would appear to contain more solid ingredients
than it actually did. A group of law students organized as SOUP
(Students Opposed to Unfair Practices) sought to intervene in
the case and argued that since a cease and desist order would not
undo the harm done both to consumers and to competitors who
did not engage in that practice, Campbell's should be required to
disclose in its future advertising that it had employed a decep-
tive practice. Although the cease and desist order did not include
a requirement for corrective advertising, the Commission indi-
cated that such a requirement would have been within its author-
ity.1' 1
v. British Oxygen Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 11 75,003-04 (D. Del. 1974) (an
acquisition). The FTC has declined to set down any guidelines for the
use of its injunctive power, 646 BNA ATRmusT TRADE REG. REP. A-6(Jan. 15, 1974), but J. Thomas Rosch, Director of the FTC's Bureau of
Consumer Protection, stated in an interview that the injunctive powers
will not be used in any "novel" cases (as reported in 645 BNA ANTITRUST
TRADE REG. REP. AA-1 (Jan. 8, 1974)).
157. Note, supra note 139 at 331-32.
158. Thain, supra note 145, at 612-13.
159. Corrective advertising would eliminate the effects of delay dur-
ing litigation. The advertiser, facing the prospect of being required to
undo his advertising at a later date, would not be able to continue using
the advertisement with impunity during litigation. See Note, The Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Corrective Advertising Order, 6 U. SAN
FRANcIsco L. REv. 367, 379 (1973); see also Note, supra note 139, at 334.
160. Campbell Soup Co., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
19,261 (FTC 1970).
161. Id. at 21,423. The practice of the Commission staff in such cases
had originally been to seek corrective advertising, which would disclose
that former advertising practices had been found to be deceptive. In
later proceedings, the staff has sought only orders requiring that adver-
tisers correct the false impressions which might linger in the mind of
the public. Thain, Corrective Advertising: Theory and Cases, 19
N.Y.L.F. 1, 7-8 (1973). See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., [1970-
73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,112 (FTC 1973), affd on other
grounds, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973). To
avoid the appearance of issuing a punitive order, which would have been
beyond the power of the FTC, the Commission required a high degree
of proof that a "residual effect" in fact existed. Firestone did not estab-
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Affirmative disclosure of material facts so as to indirectly
admit past misrepresentation is another type of remedy available
to the FTC. In the case of J. B. Williams Co. v. FTC,0 2 for ex-
ample, the FTC sought to require the maker of Geritol to af-
firmatively disclose in its advertising that the majority of peo-
ple who are physically tired do not suffer from "iron poor blood"
and that Geritol is effective only for a minority of iron anemia
sufferers, thus indirectly admitting that its previous advertising
to the contrary had been deceptive. 63 This type of affirmative
disclosure has not been a favorite remedy of the FTC, and part
of the problem may be the lengths to which advertisers will go to
avoid it. J. B. Williams is notorious for the duration of the litiga-
tion.0 4
Finally, the FTC has proposed counter-advertising to offset
effects of advertising. Counter-advertising invokes the "fairness
doctrine" of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
which requires that the broadcast media balance its programing
by presenting both sides of controversial public issues. A famil-
iar example of the doctrine's application to advertising is the re-
cent series of anti-smoking commercials. But the FCC has never
been anxious to cooperate with the counter-advertising proposal,
and has recently decided to reject it.' 65 In addition, the recent de-
cision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillol 6 suggests that
there may be constitutional obstacles to mandatory counter-ad-
lish criteria for proof of a "residual effect," however, and it will be for
later cases to determine this criteria. See Thain, supra, at 14. In ITT
Continental Baking Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1
20,242 (FTC 1973) a motion to intervene was denied to three consumer
groups who advanced the proposition that once deception had been
shown, a prima facie case of residual effect had been made and the bur-
den of proof should then shift to the advertiser to refute. Cf. Dyer &
Kuehl, The "Corrective Advertising" Remedy of the FTC: An Experi-
mental Evaluation, 38 J. MxTG., Jan., 1974, at 48, 53-54 (advertisement
to correct the false impression without disclosing that a deception had
been perpetrated may not be effective).
162. 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
163. See also Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d
18 (5th Cir. 1960) (advertiser of remedy for baldness ordered to affirma-
tively disclose that most cases of baldness cannot be cured).
164. In the most recent episode in the ongoing struggle between the
FTC and J.B. Williams, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
that the issue of noncompliance with an FTC order is a jury question.
U.S. v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
165. 671 BNA ANTITRUST TRADE REG. RE. A-16 to -17 (July 9, 1974).
FTC Chairman Engman is reported to have observed that the advertise-
ments to which counter-advertising could have been applied are those
which cannot be regulated by usual methods because of the first amend-
ment. Id.
166. 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
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vertising. The Court struck down the Florida "right-of-reply"
law,1 7 which required newspapers to print replies to editori-
als. 0 8 This holding might be limited to editorials or limited to
the print media, but the critical factor of compulsory publica-
tion'"6 would also be present in any counter-advertising order.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regulation of corporate image advertising is a delicate mat-
ter because it involves a potential for infringement of first
amendment freedoms. The delicacy is increased by the fact that
the only agency likely to be entrusted with such regulation is
the Federal Trade Commission. Both the philosophy and the pro-
cedures of the FTC have been shaped in the context of commer-
cial affairs170 and, without modification, are not necessarily suit-
able for the regulation of noncommercial corporate image ad-
vertising. Thus, while the first amendment undoubtedly per-
mits some measure of FTC regulation, it is necessary that appro-
priate limitations be recognized. Generally, insofar as regulation
is patterned after the regulation of conventional product adver-
tising, it should be limited to the sales-oriented variety of corpo-
rate image advertising, while regulation of issue-oriented adver-
tising should be limited to a determination of the truth or false-
hood of express factual representations. Such limitations, cou-
pled with strict judicial review to enforce procedural safeguards
against arbitrary administrative action,171 should result in the
167. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (1973).
168. 94 S. Ct. at 2838-39.
169. IT]he Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether a re-
striction or requirement constituted the compulsion exerted by
government on a newspaper to print that which it would not
otherwise print. The clear implication has been that any such
compulsion to publish that which "'reason' tells them should not
be published" is unconstitutional.
Id. See also Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (no obligation under the FCC "fairness doc-
trine" for broadcast media to accept paid "advertorials"); Chicago Joint
Bd., Amalgamated Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1973) (no obligation for print media
to accept paid editorial advertisements).
170. For a discussion of the framework of commercial advertising
into which the FTC fits, see, e.g., Developments in the Law-Deceptive
Advertising, supra note 122, at 1008-12.
171. For example, in NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357
(1958), the Court required the NLRB to consider all relevant factors in
deciding future cases involving "no-solicitation" rules, because of the
first amendment questions involved. Cf. National Petroleum Refiners
Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951
(1974), which upheld the power of the FTC to establish trade regula-
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proper balance between the consumer's need for protection and
the advertiser's freedom of speech. Within such limitations,
there is no reason why all of the remedies now available to the
FTC in a commercial context should not also be available for use
against the careless corporate image advertiser.
tions. The court was of the opinion that judicial review of FTC action
would suffice to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory regulations. First
amendment rights, however, were not involved in that case.
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